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WYOMING NONRESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTE
The Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute, as laid out in section
1-52 of the Wyoming Compiled Statutes (1957) and as amended in 1963,
basically provides for a method of service of process upon a nonresident
or a resident upon whom service cannot be made within the state. Also
coming within the scope of the Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute is
the agent of such nonresident or resident, personal representative, executor or administrator.
The use and operation of a motor vehicle over or upon any street or
highway within the state is deemed an appointment of the Secretary of
State as attorney upon whom service of process may be had in any action
growing out of such use and operation. Service of process is made by
serving a copy upon the Secretary of State. Within ten days thereafter the
plaintiff must also send a copy of the process, by certified mail, to the
defendant's last known address. The plaintiff must then file an affidavit
that he has complied with such requirements; or in the alternative personal service outside the state may be used.
The district court of the county in which the cause of action arose
or the district court of the county where the plaintiff resides shall have
jurisdiction over such actions.
All fifty states have adopted similar statutes.1 Nonresident motorist
statutes have been upheld as not violating "Due Process," "Privilege and
Immunites,"' 3 and the "Equal Protection" 4 clauses of the Constitution and
therefore as consitutional, thus greatly expanding the concept of jurisdiction
as laid out in Pennoyer v. Neff.5
The courts began by saying that whenever a nonresident uses the
highway of another state he is consenting to be sued there., The fiction
of consent eventually gave way to the realization that activities within the
state are the basis of jurisdiction. 7 The Supreme Court in International
Shoe v. State of Washington held that due process requires only that in
order to subject a defendant who is not present within the forum to a
judgment in personam, there must be certain minimum contacts with the
forum so that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice." It is felt that driving an
1. Note 1, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 384: Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1-52 (1957); Alaska Session Laws

Chap. 174 § 3 (1959); Hawaii Rev. Statutes § 230-33 (1957).

2. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, (1927).
3. State v. Lewis, 118 Fla. 536, 159 So. 792, 99 A.L.R. 123 (1935).

4. Kane v. State of New Jersey, 242 U.W. 160, 37 S.Ct. 30, 61 L.Ed. 222 (1916).
5. 95 U.S. 714, 24 LEd. 565 (1877).

Jurisdiction is based upon presence within the

state and service while there.
6. Supra note 2.
7. The language of the nonresident motorist statutes is, however, still coined in the

terms of consent.
8. 326 U.S. 310, (1945); Hansen v. Denckla, 355 U.S. 22, (1957), established the jurisdictional limits of minimal contacts.
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automobile in a state is such sufficient minimum contact that maintenance
of a suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."
The constitutionality of a nonresident motorist statute phrased within
the limits imposed by the due process clause, which is the only serious
constitutional limitation, is no longer questioned. 10 Litigation has shifted
from an attack on the jurisdictional basis of the statutes to questions concerning the proper construction of their terms. Basically there is very
little variation in the different state nonresident motorist statutes. However, diverse terminology has led to a variety of results in similar cases."
Generally, the courts strictly construe the nonresident motorist statutes
as being in derogation of the common law. 12 However, the courts are not
justified in using strict construction to defeat the intention of the legislature' 3 and to restrict the remedy provided.'' One court considered the
nonresident motorist statute as remedial in nature, procedural, and therefore to be liberally construed.'Section 1-2 of the Wyoming Compiled
Statutes (1957) provides:
The provisions of this act and all proceedings under it shall be
liberally construed in order to promote its object and assist the
parties in obtaining justice; and the rule of the common law that
statutes in derogation thereof must be strictly construed, has no
application to this act; but this section shall not be so construed
as to require a liberal construction of provisions affecting personal
liberty, relating to amercement, or of a penal nature.
The Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute will be examined to
determine if it is in harmony with the constitutional requirements and the
extent of its coverage.
Under the Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute, service of process
is made by serving a copy upon the Secretary of State :td within tell days
, fter such service the plaintiff must send, by certified mail, to the defendant's last known address, a copy of the process.
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process
in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reason9. The idea of minimal contacts has been adopted in Wyoming and is laid out in
Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, 382 P.2d 886 (Wyo. 1963).
10. Supra note 2.
11. Parr v. Gregg, 70 O.A. 235, 42 N.E.2d 922 (1942); Cody v. Francil Schwarz, 152
F.Supp. 379 (S.D. Ohio W.D. 1957); Johnson v. Ciegel, 110 N.J.L. 374, 165 Atd. 869
(1933) ; Eckman v. Baker, 224 F.2d 954 (3rd Cir. 1955); Weaver v. Winn Dixie
Stores, 160 F.Supp. 621, (N.D. Ohio E.D. 1958); Tipton v. Fleet Maintenance, 75
Abs. 516, 152 N.E.2d 882 (1957) ; Pray v. Maier, 69 O.A. 141, 40 N.E,2d 850 (1942)
McLeod v. Birnbaum, 14 N.J.M. 485, 185 Atl. 667 (1936).
12. Jeramaine v. Graf, 225 Iowa 1063, 283 N.W. 428 (1939) ; Harris v. Owens, 142 Ohio
379, 52 N.E.2d 522 (1943) ; Bond V. Golden, 273 F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1959) ; Carlson
v. Dist. Ct. of City and County of Denver, 116 Colo. 330, 180 P.2d 525 (1947)..
13. Jones v. Pebler, 371 Ill. 309, 20 N.E.2d 592 (1939).
14. Kohanovick v. Youree, 51 Del. 440, 147 Atl.2d 655 (1959).
15. State v. Dist. Ct. of 6th Jud. Dist., 112 Mont. 253, 114 P.2d 1047 (1941).
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ably calculated under all the circumstances, to appraise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. 16
The question is, does the Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute
comply with the requisites of due process? In Schilling v. Odelbak a nonresident motorist statute similar to Wyoming's was upheld as constitutional 17 The court stated, "the statute provides such prerequisites that
it is safe to conclude that it was reasonably certain that the defendant
would receive actual notice and that adequate opportunity was afforded
him to defend."' 8
The term "last known address" has led to some confusion. It does
not mean the last address known to the plaintiff. 19 "Last known address"
is the one that is most likely to give the party to be served notice, although
actual notice is not essential, and such address may be a non-resident's place
of business or his residence. 20 Some courts have held that the phrase "last
known address," means his last address so far as it is reasonably possible
to ascertain, and this the plaintiff must learn at his peril. 2 1 The trend is
to sustain the validity of the process if there is a probability that if the
22
statute is complied with the defendant will receive actual notice.
It was held in Freedman v. Poirier that a statute providing for mailing notice of service to the nonresident's "last known address" was unconstitutional for failure to make it reasonably probable that notice *of
service on the Secretary of State would be communicated to the defendant. 23 The nonresident motorist statute relied on failure to provide a
specific time limit in which a copy of the process was to be mailed to the
defendant. This prompted the court to say that in absence of a provision
to the contrary, a copy of the process might be delivered to the defendant
at any time before or even after the return day. Some states that do not
provide a specified time limit say that notice of service should be given
with all reasonable dispatch and do not seem to worry about the time
limit.2 4 Wyoming puts a time limit of ten days after service and thus
avoids this problem.
Is the defendant deprived of his rights without due process when he
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.
24.

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
177 Minn. 90, 224 N.W. 694 (1929).
Id. at 696.
Glen v. Holub, 36 F. Supp. 941, 942, (S.D. Iowa 1941).
Conner v. Miller, 154 Ohio 313, 96 N.E.2d 13, 17 (1950). Defendant had a known
business address at a time subsequent to his leaving the last known residential
address. The court held that a copy of the precess sent to that residence and
not received by such defendant was not sent to "last known address" of such
defendant within the meaning of the statute.
Hartley v. Vitiello, 113 Conn. 74, 154 Ad. 255, 259 (1931); Drinkard v. Eastern
Airlines, 290 S.W.2d 175 (1956).
Sorenson v. Stowers, 251 Wisc. 398, 29 N.W.2d 512 (1957). The court held that the
plaintiff was entitled to rely on the address stated in the police report and was not
obliged at his peril to ascertain the last absolute or true address of the defendant.
134 Misc. 253, 236 N.Y.S. 96 (1929).
Supra note 21.
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has not received actual notice of the action? The Wyoming Nonresident
Motorist Statute does not contain a provision requiring a return receipt

from the defendant. Without a return receipt the defendant could argue
that he did not have notice. Any action commenced against a defendant
would not be a complete surprise since everyone is usually aware of the
fact that they have been involved in an accident. But knowing of an
accident isn't knowledge as to the particular time the suit is to be commenced so as to permit a defendant an opportunity to appear and defend.
Many nonresident motorist statutes require the filing of a return receipt.25
Such provisions have been construed to mean that the defendant must
have actual notice of the action before jurisdiction over him is acquired.20
Even in those jurisdictions where a return receipt is required this does not
mean that the defendant may refuse to receive the notice and sign
a receipt and thus invalidate the service. 27 Other jurisdictions with nonresident motorist statutes requiring a return receipt have held that it
is not an absolute requirement that the defendant actually receive the
notice, provided the plaintiff has acted in good faith.2 s In view of these
decisions it may be inferred that it is not an absolute requirement that a
provision for a return receipt be embodied in the nonresident motorist
statute. ]n Milliken v. Meyer the court stated that whether or not due
process is satisfied does not depend upon actual notice but open whether
or not it is reasonanably calculated to give him actual notice.2 ' Where
a return receipt is not required, jurisdiction is acquired by service upon
the secretary of State and not upon the defendant. It is therefore not
considered fatal if the defendant does not actually receive notice. Throughout this discussion the fundamental requisite of due process must be kept
in mind, viz., the opportunity to be heard. Even if the service is reasonably
calculated to give notice, what good is the service if you are not actually
in formed?

Another area that has been attacked on constitutional grounds is the
venue provision of the nonresident motorist statutes. The venue provision
in the Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute provides that the district
court of the county in which the cause of action arose or where the plaintiff resides may hear the action. On the other hand, if the action is against
a resident, section 1-37 of the Wyoming Compiled Statutes (1957) provides
that the action must be brought where the defendant resides or where
lie may summoned. It might be said that discrimination results by reason
of these two statutes. When the action is against a resident defendant,
25. Hart v. Wiener, 258 App. Div. 371, 17 N.Y.S.2d 87, (1940) ; Weiss v. Magnussen,
13 F. Supp. 948, (D.C. Va. 1936).
26. Bucholz v. Hutton, 153 F. Supp. 62 (D.C. Mont. 1958); Alexander v. Bush, 199
Ark. 562, 134 S.W.2d 519 (1939); Muncie v. Westcraft Corp., 58 Wash.2d 36, 360
P.2d 744 (1961).

27. State ex rel. Charette v. Dist. Ct. of Silver Bow County, 107 Mont. 489, 86 P.2d 750
(1939); Creadivk v. Keller, 160 Atd. 909 (Del. 1932).
28. William v. Egan, 308 P.2d 273, (Okla. 1957); Voliner v. Hoel, 87 Ohio App., 93
N.E.2d 416, (1950).
29. 311 U.S. 457, 132 A.L.R. 1357, (1940).
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the plaintiff has to go after him and the defendant cannot be subjected
to suit at plaintiff's residence, unless it happens that he is found and
served while there. When the action is against a nonresident defendant,
the nonresident can be forced to defend where plaintiff resides even if
the action arises in another county and even though the defendant is not
found within the county of the plaintiff's residence.
In Henry Fisher Packing Co. v. Mattox 0 a nonresident motorist
statute similar to Wyoming's was held unconstitutional for the reason that
the venue provision was discriminatory and violated the "Equal Protection
Clause" of the Constitution.
If the law with relation to the use of highways should be uniform
when dealing with residents and nonresidents it should be uniform
when redress is sought for injury occurring on the roads. The procedure provided should not result in a disadvantage or advantage
against or in favor of either one or the other; if it does so the law
3
is discriminatory and constitutes a lack of equal protection. 1
In reaching this conclusion the court relied on the Power Mfg. Co. v.
Saunders case.3 2 Here the venue provision permitted a foreign corporation to be stied in any county of the state; whereas if the suit was against
a resident the suit was required to be brought in the county where the
corporation had its place of business or where an agent resided. The
United States Supreme Court held that the statute discriminated against
foreign corporations and was in violation of the "Equal Protection Clause"
of the Constitution. The court went on to say,
The clause in the fourteenth amendment forbidding a state to
deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
equal laws does not prevent a state from adjusting its legislation
to differences in situations or forbid classification in that connection, but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary,
but based on real and substantial difference having a reasonable
relation to the subject of the legislation.~3
I'he statute in the Power case permitted nonresidents to be stied in
any county of the state; whereas in the Fisher case the nonresident could
only be sued in the county where the injury occurred or where the plaintiff
resided. It seems that the court in the Fisher case broadened the doctrine
as set forth in the Power case, overlooked the fact that a state can under
its police powers make such regulations as long as they do not arbitrarily
discriminate, and failed to discuss to any extent the meaning of the word
arbitrary.
A defendant in Wyoming, whether a resident or a nonresident, may
be forced to defend where the plaintiff resides. A nonresident may be
30.
31.
32.
33.

262 Ky. 318, 90 S.W.2d 70 (1936).
Id. at 71.
274 U.S. 490, (1927).
Id. at 493.
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forced to defend at plaintiff's residence a greater number of times than
the resident, but this alone is not discrimination. If the nonresident feels
that it will be hardship he can move for a change of venue or remove
34
the action to a Federal court on the ground of diversity of citizenship.
It has also been determined that a nonresident motorist statute does
not deprive a person of the equal protection of the laws for the reasons
that it accords a fair trial in a court of competent jurisdiction to all who
are in the same category and that the legislature is not without power
to make exceptions to the general rule. 5,
The Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute is broad enough to include constructive service upon the personal representative of a deceased
nonresident motorist. One court has said that a statute which provides
for service upon the personal representative is unconstitutional.3 6 One
of the arguments used to attack such a provision is that since the statute
rests upon the implied consent of the nonresident for the appointment of
the Secretary of State as his agent, the agency is revoked by death. The
court in Brook v. National Bank of Topeka said, "the state police power
is not limited by the ordinary rules of agency." 3 7 A second argument as
laid out in Knopp v. Anderson, which is the only case so holding, is that
an action against the estate is in rem and the state where the accident occurred cannot create a right against property wholly within another jurisdiction. 38 In spite of these analyses the validity of such provisions has
been upheld. 3 9
Setting the constitutional issues aside, the nonresident motorist statute

will be probed to determine the scope of its coverage. Uncertainty arises
as to what specific acts are included within the meaning of the words "use
and operation." it is felt that the operation of a motor vehicle includes
more than its movements over the highways.40

Some courts feel that a

motor vehicle can be operated even when it is standing or parked at the
time of the accident."
Another jurisdiction holds that such actions as
34. In the ordinary case, extreme hardship to a defendant can be mitigated if the
defendant moves to a federal court on the ground of diversity of citizenship under
28 U.S.C. § 1441, and then moves for a change of venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1404 (a).
The principle of forum non conveniens may also be available. Gilbert v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F.2d 883, (C.C.A. N.Y. 1946); Price v. Atchinson T.&S.F. Ry.
Co., 42 C.2d 577, 43 A.L.R.2d 756, 268 P.2d 457, 458 (1954).
A defendant may
also ask for change of venue pursuant to section 1-53 of the Wyoming Complied
Statutes 1957.
35. Panzram v. O'Donnell, 48 F. Supp. 74, (S.D. Minn. 1942).

36. Knopp v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
37.

251 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1958).

.38. Supra note 36.
39. Oviatt v. Garretson, 205 Ark. 792, 171 S.W.2d 287 (1943); Leighton v. Roper, 300
N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 876, 18 A.L.R.2d 537 (1950).
Certain rules of jurisdiction must
yield to the reasonable use of police power. Plopa v. DuPre, 327 Mich. 660, 42
N.W.2d 777 (1950).
40. McDonald v. Superior Ct., 43 Calif. Rep.2d 621, 275 P.2d 464 (1954).
41. Hand & Frazer, 248 N.Y.S. 557 (1931) ; Chiarello v. Guerin Special Motor Freight.
92 A.2d 136 (N.J. 1952).
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loading or unloading or injury occurring while parked have no relation
to the use of the highway and therefore do not come within the scope of
42
the statute.
4 3
a statute similar to Wyoming's was brought
In Brauer v. Parkhill
into operation. An injury occurred when a truck, which was parked off
the highway, was being unloaded. The court said, "It make no difference
where the injury actually occurs if it may be attributed to the use of the
highway and naturally flows therefrom." It was felt that this injury did
not result from the use and operation of a motor vehicle on the highway.
More emphasis was placed on the fact that the truck was not on the
highway at the time of the accident than on the terms "use and operation."
The decision might have been different if the truck had been parked on
the highway at the time it was being unloaded.

The question arises as to just who is a nonresident within the meaning of a nonresident motorist statute. Generally, the statutes have been
construed to apply to the designated class of nonresident defendants in
strict accord with the purpose intended to be accomplished. 44 Residence
has three possible meanings: legal domicile, temporary abode, and actual
residence. 45 "The courts are inclined to adopt the concept of actual
residence as distinguished from domicile as governing the applicability of
the nonresident motorist statutes." 411 In Chaprnan v. Davis47 the court
said:
Applying this concept of actual residence, if a person legally domiciled in one state has an actual residence in another state, he may
be served as a nonresident in a suit arising out of the operation
of his car in the state of his domicile. On the other hand, if the
person actually resides within the state when and where the accident occurs, he is not subject to constructive service of process
even though his domicile is elsewhere. While actual residence has
a less permanent connotation than domicile, it is not mere temporary abode. A temporary absence from the usual place of
abode does not terminate an actual residence. Thus if a person
who is living in a state for a limited time without any intention
of making it his home and while there, injures a person through
the operation or use of an automobile
he could be served under
48
the statute as a nonresident.
A nonresident motorist statute does not apply to a person who is
employed within the state, who makes a home for himself and his family
within the state and who during a reasonable period of time is available
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Brown v. Hertz, 203 Misc. 728, 116 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1952).
383 I11.
569, 50 N.E.2d 836 (1943).
Clark v. Reichman, 130 Colo. 329. 275 P.2d 952 (1954).
Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 45 N.W.2d 822 (1951).
53 A.L.R.2d 1192.
Supra note 45.
Supra note 45 at p. 826.

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

for personal service of process, but applies only to a transient motorist who
49
is here today and gone tomorrow.
It has been established that a corporation,5 ° partnership, 51 minor, 52
resident of a foreign country, 2 and one physically present in a foreign
country,5 4 are nonresidents within the meaning of a nonresident motorist
statute.
In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, it is generally held
that one who is resident at the time of the accident, but subsequently
becomes a nonresident, is not subject to constructive service under the
act.55 Some states, including Wyoming, have overcome this problem by
specifically including within the scope of their nonresident motorist
statute a resident who becomes a nonresident prior to service within the
state.
The Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute also expressly covers
agents. According to Austinson v. Kilpatrick "if an agent was not acting
within the scope of his employment this would not permit the defendant
to challenge the substituted service, but would be a defense to be brought
up at the trial of the action."5 ' When a member of the family is driving
the automobile at the time it is involved in an accident, the family purpose doctrine has been used to bring them within the scope of the non57
resident motorist statute.
The term "motor vehicle" has created a dilemma
because it is not clear as to what type of vehicles are
the term. Some states have supplied a definition that
the nonresident motorist statute. Section 31-12 of the
piled Statutes (1957) provides the following definition of

in some states
included within
is applicable to
Wyoming Coma motor vehicle:

"Motor vehicle" shall include all vehicles propelled or drawn
other than by muscular power, operated upon public highways,
except trailers, machinery used in construction work, not designed as a motor truck and not used for transportation of property
over the highways, and implements used exclusively for farm
husbandry.
49. Honeycutt v. Nyquist, Peterson & Co., 12 Wyo. 183, 74 P. 90 (1903).
50. Dealers Transport Co. v. Reese, 138 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1943). A domestic corporation is not a nonresident within the meaning of the statute. Sease v. Central greyhound Lines, 306 N.Y. 284, 117 N.E.2d 899 (1954). Nor is a foreign corporation
which has a place of business in the forum state in the charge of an agent upon
whom service can be made. 194 Ga. 113, 20 S.E.2d 575 (1942).
51. Rigutto v. Italian Terrozza Mosaic Co., 93 F. Supp. 124 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
52. Silver Swan Liquor Corp. v. Adams, 43 Cal. App.2d 851, 110 P.2d 1097 (1941).
53. Lulevitch v. Hill, 82 F. Supp. 612 (E.D. Penn. 1949); Ewing v. Thompson, 233 N.C.
564, 65 S.E.2d 17 (1951).
54. Supra note 52.
55. Warwick v. Dist. Ct. of City and County of Denver, 269 P.2d 704 (Colo. 1954);
Clendening v. Fitterer, 261 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1953); Teague v. Dist. Ct., 289 P.2d 331
(Utah 1955).
56. 82 N.W.2d 388 (N.D. 1957).
57. Ewing v. Thompson, 233 N.C. 564, 65 SE.2d 17 (1951).
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A somewhat similar definition is found in section 31-78 of the Wyoming
Compiled Statutes (1957). The problem then arises as to whether or not
these definitions of motor vehicle can be used in the context of the
nonresident motorist statute. In Hayes Freight Lines v. Clealtonr8 the
court refused to apply a definition of motor vehicle appearing in the
statute on motor carriers, which included a trailer, and held that a trailer
was not a motor vehicle within the scope of the nonresident motorist statute.
The place where the accident occurred must be considered, since the
Wyoming Nonresident Motorist Statute limits it to "street or highway
within the State."
Such statutes are usually construed not to include
accidents occurring on private property.511 However, accidents occurring
on undedicated public roads,60 sidewalks, 6 1 or public driveways, 62 have
been included within the scope of "street or highway."
The availability of the nonresident motorist statute in actions comcenced by a nonresident plaintiff against a nonresident defendant is well
settled in state courts. 63 In federal courts a nonresident plaintiff may not
sue a nonresident defendant in view of the Supreme Court decision in
Olberding v. Ill. Cent. RR.6 4 because there is no federal venue. The
court said,
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of
citizenship, may, except as otherwise provided by law be brought
only in the judicial district where all the plaintiffs or all defendants reside. 5
The effect of this decision is to deprive a nonresident plaintiff of a
federal forum at the locus of the accident. 60
There has been some discussion in the federal courts as to the availability of a state's nonresident motorist statute in a suit originating in
67
the federal courts. The general consensus seems to permit such use.
The rule is that any formh of service which would be good in the state
where the district court is sitting shall also be good in the federal court.
Any doubt that may have existed on this point has been removed by the
1963 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4 (d) (7), (e), and

(f).
-Since the nonresident motorist statutes have generally been upheld
58. 277 P.2d 622 (Okla. 1954).
59. Brauer Machine & Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co., 383 Ill. 569, 50 N.E.2d 836
(1943) ; Kelley v. Koetting, 164 Kan. 542, 190 P.2d 361 (1948) ; Rilling v. Jones, 130
F.Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1955).
60. Galloway v. Wyatt Metal and Boiler Works, 189 La. 837, 181 So. 187 (1938).
61. Morrisey v. Crabtree, 143 F. Supp. 105, (M.D. N.C. 1956).
62. Bertrand v. Wilds, 198 Tenn. 543, 281 S.W.2d 390 (1955).
63. Peeples v. Ranispacker, 29 F.Supp. 632 (E.D. S.C. 1939); Fine v. Wencke. 117 Conn.
683, 169 Atd. 58 (1933); Welsh v. Ruop, 228 Iowa 70, 289 N.W. 760 (1940).
64. 346 U.S. 338 (1953).
65. Id. at 341.
66. Weber v. Threlkel, 126 F. Supp. 98 (D. Wyo. 1954).
67. 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751.
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as constitutional, the only condition that will prevent a plaintiff from using
the statute to procure the desired relief is if the particular accident or
defendant does not fall within the scope of the terminology of the statute.
-Km McDONALD

